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WILLIAM R. GRANT, Appellant, v. FRANK H. McAULIFFE, as Administrator, etc., Respondent.
[Sac. No. 6417.

In Bank.

Dec. 23, 1953]

RUSSELL M. MANCHESTER, Appellant, v. FRANK H.
McAULIFFE, as Administrator, etc., Respondent.
~Sae.

No. 6418. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1953.]

DOYLE O. JENSEN, Appellant, v. FRANK H. McAULIFFE, as Administrator, etc., Respondent.
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[1] Conl1ict of Laws-Torts.-In actions on torts occuring abroad,
courts of this state determine substantive matters inherent
in cause of action by adopting as their own the law of place
where tortious acts occurred, unless it is contrary to public
policy of this state.
[2] Id.-Torts.-No court can enforce any law but that of its
own sovereign and, when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction
foreign to place of tort, he can only invoke an obligation
recognized by that sovereign.
[8] Id.-Torts.-The forum does not adopt as its own the procedural law of place where tortious acts occur.
[4] Death - Wrongful Death - Nature of Aetion.-A cause of
action for wrongful death is statutory; it is a new cause of
action vested in widow or next" of kin, and arises on death of
injured person; it is to be distinguished from separate cause
of action which injured person has before death and which,
if such cause of action survives, can be enforced by personal
representative of deceased against tort feasor.
[6] Abatement - Death of Pa.rty - Survival of Actions - Tort
Actions.-Survival statutes do not create a new cause of action,
[1] State or country d'lemed to be place of tort causing personal
injury or death, as regards principle that law of place of tort
governs, note, 133 A.L.R. 260. See, also, Ca1.Jur.2d, Conflict of
Laws, § 79 et seq.; Am.Jur., Conflict of Laws, § 180 et seq.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Abatement and Revival, § 63 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Abatement and Revival, § 84 et seq.
HcX. Dig. References: [1-3] Conflict of Laws, §13; [4] Death,
112; [5, 9-13, 15] Abatement, § 42; [6] Abatement, 142; Limitation of Actions, § 16; [7] Limitation of Actions, § 16; [8] Statutes,
16; [14] Abatement, § 48.
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as do wrongful death statutes; they merely prevent abatement
of cause of action of injured person, and provide for its enforcement by or against personal representative of deceased.
[6] ld.-Death of Party: Limitation of Actions-Law Governing.Survival statutes are analagous of statutes to limitations,
which are procedural for conflict of law purposes and are
governed by domestic law of forum.
[7) Limitation of Actions-Law Governing.-A cause of action arising in another state, by laws of which an action cannot be
maintained thereon because of lapse of time, can be enforced
in California by a citizen of this state if he has held cause of
action from time it accrued. (Code Civ. Proc., § 361.)
[8] Statutes - Classification. - "Substance" and "procedure" are
not legal concepts of invariable content, and a statute or other
rule of law will be characterized as substantive or procedural
according to nature of problem fOT which a characterization
must be made.
[9] Abatement-Death of Party......; Survival of Actions - Revival
Distinguished.-Purported distinction between survival of
causes of action as substantive and revival of actions as procedural is not a valid one, since in most "revival" 4itatutes
substitution of a personal representative in place of deceased
party is expressly conditioned on survival of cause of action
itself.
[10] ld.-Death of Party-Survival of Actions-Tort Actions.H cause of action dies with tort feasor, a pending proceeding
must be abated; a personal representative cannot be substituted in place of deceased party unless cause of action is
still subsisting.
[11] ld. - Death of Party - Survival of Actions - What Law
Governs.-Survival of causes of action should be governed by
law of fornID.
[12] ld. - Death of Party - Survival of Actions - What Law
Governs.-Survival is not an essential part of cause of action
itself but relates to procedures available for enforcement of
legal claims for damages; basically the question is one of administration of decedents' estates, which is a purely local
proceeding.
[18] ld. - Death of Party - SurviVal of Actions - What Law
Governs.-Responsibilities of defendant, as administrator of
decedent's estate, for injuries inflicted by decedent before his
death are governed by laws of this state and not by t)1I)II" of
state in which injuries occurred.
[14] ld.-Death of Party-Survival of Actions-Actions for Pel'sonal Injuries.-The common-law doctrine actio "er"onaZ~
moritur cum per,QfIG had its origin in a penal concept of ~
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liability, whereas today tort liabilities of sort involved in
actions against administrator of decedent's estate for injuries
caused by alleged negligence of decedent are regarded as compensatory.
{l5] ld. - Death of Party - Survival of Actions - What Law
Governs.-Where all three plaintiffs, as wen a deceased tort
feasor, were residents of California at time of automobile accident in Arizona, and estate of deceased tort feasor is being
administered in California, plaintiffs' right to prosecute their
causes of action against such estate for damages for alleged
negligence of dccensed is governed by laws of this state relating to administration of estates.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Plumas
County abating actions on claims against an estate. William
M. Macmillan, Judge. Orders reversed.
J. Oscar Goldstein, P. M. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein
and Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein for Appellants.
Honey & Mayall and John J. Hurley for Respondent.

)
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TRAYNOR, J.-On December 17, 1949, plaintiffs W. R.
Grant and R. M. Manchester were riding west on United
States Highway 66 in an automobile owne.d and driven by
plaintiff D. O. Jensen. Defendant's decedent, W. W. Pullen,
was driving his automobile east on the same highway. The
two automobiles collided at a point approximately 15 miles
east of Flagstaff, Arizona. J ensen'~ automobile was badly
damaged, and Jensen, Grant, and Manchester suffered personal injuries. Nineteen days later, on January 5, 1950,
Pullen died as a result of injuries received in the collision.
Defendant McAuliffe was appointed administrator of his
estate and letters testamentary were issued by the Superior
Court of Plumas County. All three plaintiffs, as well as
Pullen, were residents of California at the time of the colJision. After the appointment of defendant, each plaintiff
presented his claim for damages. Defendant rejected all three
claims, and on December 14, 1950, each plaintiff filed an action
. against the estate of Pullen to recover damages for the injuries
caused by the alleged negligence of the decedent. Defendant
filed a general demurrer and a motion to abate each of the complaints. The trial court entered an order granting the motion
in each case. Each plaintiff has appealed. The appeals are
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based on the same ground and have therefor6 been consolidated.
The basic question is whether plaintiffs' causes of action
against Pullen survived his death and are maintainable against
his estate. The statutes of this state provide that causes of
action for negligent torts survive the death of the tort feasor
and can be maintained against the administrator or executor
of his estate. (Civ. Code, § 956; Code Civ. Proc., § 385; Prob.
Code, §§ 573, 574.) Defendant contends, however, that the
survival of a cause of action is a matter of substantive law,
and that the courts of this state must apply the law of Arizona
governing survival of causes of action. There is no provision
for surnval of causes of action in the statutes of Arizona,
although there is a provision that in the event of the death
of a party to a pending proceeding his personal representative
can be substituted as a party to the action (Arizona Code,
1939, § 21-534), if the cause of action survives. (Arizona
Code, 1939. § 21-530.) The Supreme Court of Arizona has
held that if a tort action has not been commenced before the
death of the tort feasor a plea in abatement must be sustained.
(McOlure v. Johnson, 50 Ariz. 76, 82 [69 P.2d 573]. See,
also, McLellan v. Au,tomobile Ins. 00. of Hartford, Oonn.,
80 F.2d 344.)
[1] Thus, the answer to the question whether the causes
of action against Pullen survived and are maintainable against
his estate depends on whether Arizona or California law applies. In actions on torts occurring abroad, the courts of this
state determine the substantive matters inherent in the cause
of action by adopting as their own the law of the place where
the torti(lus acts occurred, unless it is contrary to the public
policy of this state. (Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362 [10
P.2d 63. S4 A.L.R. 1264].) [2] "[N]o court can enforce any
law but that of its own sovereign, and. when a suitor comes
to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can only
invoke an obligation recognized by that sovereign. A foreign
sovereign under civilized law imposes an obligation of its
own as J.:early homologous as possible to that arising in the
place where the tort occurs." (Learned Hand, J., in Guin"ess v. Miller, 291 F. 769, 770.) [3] But the forum does
not adopt as its own the procedural law of the place where
the tortiJus acts occur. It must, therefore, be determined
whether survival of causes of action is procedural or substantive for tOnflict of laws purposes.
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This question is one of first impression in this state. The
precedents in other jurisdictions are conflicting. In many
cases it has been held that the survival of a cause of action
is a matter of substance and that the law of the place where
the tortious acts occurred must be applied to determine the
question. (Burg v. Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 335-338 [67 S.W.2d
96]; Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 227-230 [234
N. W. 314, 868], followed in Kerston v. Johnson, 185 Minn.
591,593 [242 N.W. 329]; Davis v. New York & N. E. R. Co.,
143 Mass. 301, 305-306 [9 N.E. 815]; Hyde v. Wabash, St. L.
& Pac. Ry. Co., 61 Iowa 441,444 [16 N.W. 351, 47 Am.St.Rep.
820] [but see Gordon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa
449, 451 [134 N.W. 1057, Ann.Cas. 1915B 113]]; Mextcan
Cent. Ry. Co. v. Goodman, 20 Tex.Civ.App. 109, 110 [48 S.W.
778] [but see Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375,
378 [4 S.W. 627]]; Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 38 Vt.
294. 307-311; Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387, 388 [54 S.Ct.
211. 78 L.Ed. 378], followed in McIntosh v. General Chem.
Defense Corp., 67 F.Supp. 63, 64, Woollen v. Lorenz, 98 F.2d
261, 262 [68 App.D.C. 389], Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696.
697-698, and Muir v. Kessinger, 45 F.Supp. 116, 117; Orr v.
Ahern, 107 Conn. 174. 178-180 [139 A. 691]: Potter v. First
Nat. Bank, 107 N.J.Eq. 72. 74-75 [151 A. 546]. fonowed in
Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N.J.L. 462, 464-466 [166 A. 119],
and Rathgebet· v. Sommerhalder. 112 N.J.L. 546. 548-549
[171 A. 835]; Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124. 127 [167 A.
315].) The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, section 390.
is in accord. It should be noted. however, that the majority
of the foregoing cases were decided after drafts of the Restatement were first circulated in 1929. Before that time. it
appears that the weight of authority was that survival of
causes of action is procedural and governed by the domestic
law of the forum. (Austin v. Pittsburg, C., C., & St. L. Ry.
Co., 122 Ky. 304, 309-310 r91 S.W. 742J: Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co. v. Joy, 173 U.S. 226. 231 [19 S.Ct: 387. 43 L.Ed. 677];
Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244. 248-249 r182 N.Y.S. 803];
Herzog v. Stern. 264 N.Y. 379. 383-384 [191 N.E. 23]. followed in Demuth v. Griffin. 253 App.Div. 399. 401 [2 N.Y.S.
2d 2], Domres v. Storms, 236 App.Div. 630 (260 N.Y.S. 335],
St1verman v. Rappaport. 165 Misc. 543. 545-546 r300 N.Y.S.
76], Taynton v. Vollmer, 242 App.Div. 854 (275 N.Y.S. 2841:
Gordon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 449. 451 [134
N.W. 1057]: In re V'/,1as' Estate. 166 Ore. 115. 123-124 rno
P.2d 940]; Martin v. Baltimore d'; Ohio R. Co., 151 U.S. 673,
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692-693 [14 S.Ot. 533, 38 L.Ed. 311] ; Martin v. Wabash R.
Co., 142 F. 650, 651 [73 C.C.A. 646, 6 Ann.Cas. 582] ; Page
v. United Fruit 00.,3 F.2d 747, 754; Matter of Killough, 148
Misc. 73, 85-89 [265 N.Y.S. 301]; Texas If; Pac. Ry. 00. v.
Richards, 68 Tex. 375,378 [4 S.W. 627). See, also, Barker v.
Ladd, Fed.Cas. 990 [3 Sawy. 44] ; Gaskins v. BontUs, 4 F.
Supp. 547, 551; Luster v. Martin, 58 F.2d 537, 539-540; Portland Gold Mining 00. v. Stratton's Independence, Ltd., 196
F. 714,716-717; Whitten v. Bennett, 77 F. 271, 273; Winslow
v. Domestic Engineering 00., 20 F.Supp. 578, 579.) Many
of the cases, decided both before and after the Restatement,
holding that survival is substantive and must be determined
by the law of the place where the tortious acts occurred, confused the problems involved in survival of causes of action
with those involved in causes of action for wrongful death.
(See, for example, the precedents on which the courts relied
in Hyde v. Wabash, St. L. If; Pac. Ry. 00., supra, 61 Iowa
441; Orr v. Ahern, supra, 107 Conn. 174; and Ormsby v. Ohase,
supra, 290 U.S. 387.) The problems are not analogous. (See
Schumacher, "Rights of Action Under Death and Survival
Statutes," 23 Mich.L.Rev. 114, 116-117, 124-125.) [4] A
cause of action for wrongful death is statutory. It is a new
cause of action vested in the widow or next of kin, and
arises on the death of the injured person. Before his
death, the injured person himself has a separate and distinct
cause of action and, if it survives, the same cause of action
can be enforced by the personal representative of the deceased
against the tort feasor. [6] The survival statutes do not
create a new cause of action, as do the wrongful death statutes. (Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. 00., supra, 38 Vt. 294,
303-306; Austin v. Pittsburg, 0., 0., If; St. L. Ry. 00., supra,
122 Ky. 304, 308-310; Martin v. Baltimore If; Ohio R. 00.,
supra, 151 U.S. 673, 696, 698, 701; Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S.
608, 612-615 [22 S.Ct. 493, 46 L.Ed. 713]; Spring v. Webb,
227 F. 481, 484-485; 1 C.J.S., p. 211; Schumacher, supra, 23
Mich.L.Rev. 114, 124-125. The English courts have reached
the same result in construing similar statutes: Davies v. Powell
D1tfferin Assoc. Oollieries, Ltd., [1942) A.C. 601, 610-616;
Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 852, 855-856. See, also, Bradshaw v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. 00., [1875) 10 C.P.
189, 192-193.) They merely prevent the abatement of the
cause of action of the injured person, and provide for its
enforcement by or against the personal representative of the de.
ceased. [6] They are analogous to statutes of limitation, which

/

)
Dec. 1953]

GRANT tI. MCAULIFFE

865

(41 C.2d 859; 264 P.2d 844]

are procedural for conflict of laws purposes and are governed
by the domestic law of the forum. (Biewend v. Bicwend, 17
Ca1.2d 108, 114 [109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264].) [7] Thus,
a cause of action arising in another state, by the laws of which
an action cannot be maintained thereon because of lapse of
time, can be enforced in California by a citizen of this state,
if he has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 361; Stewart v.Spaulding, 72 Cal. 264,
266 [13 P. 661]. See, also. Biewend v. Bicwend, supra-; and
Western Coal ~ Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Ca1.2d 819. 828 [167
P. 719, 164 A.L.R. 685].)
Defendant contends, however, that the characterization of
sun'ival of causes of action as substantive or procedural is
foreclosed by Cort v. Steen, 36 Cal.2d 437, 442 [224 P.2d 723],
where it was held that the California survival statutes were
substantive and therefore did not apply retroactively. The
problem in the present proceeding, however, is not whether
the survival statutes apply retroactively, but whether they are
substantive or procedural for purposes of conflict of laws.
[8] "'Substance' and 'procedure' . . . are not legal con_cepts of invariable content" (Black Diamond Steamskip Corp.
v. Stewart ~ Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 397 [69 S.Ct. 622,93 L.Ed.
754]. See, also, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
[65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079, 160 A.L.R. 1231]; Sampson
v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756, 758; Estate of Caravas, 40
CaUd 38, 41-42 [250 P.2d 593J; W. W. Cook, The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942), c. 6: "Substance and Procedure"), and a statute or other rule of law will
be characterized as substantive or lIrocedural according to the
nature of the problem for which a characterization must be
mad~.

[9] Defendant also contends that a distinction must be
drawn between survival of causes of action and revival of
actions, and that the former are substantive but the latter
procedural. On the basis of this distinction, defendant concludes that many of the cases cited above as holding that survival is procedural and is governed by the domestic law of
the forum do not support this position, since they involved
problems of "revival" rather than "survival." The distinction urged by defendant is not a valid one. Most of the
statutes invoived in the cases cited provided for the "revival"
of a pending proceeding by or against the personal representative ofa party thereto should he die while the action is still
Q C.Jd-.Z8
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pending. But in most "revival" statutes, substitution of a
personal representative in place of a deceased party is. expressly conditioned on the survil'al of the cause of action
itself.' [10] If the cause of action dies with the tort feasor, a
pending proceeding must be abated. A personal representative cannot be substituted in the place of a deceased party
unless the cause of action is still subsisting. In cases where
this substitution ha& occurred, the courts have looked to the
domestic law of the forum to determine whether the cause of
action surVlves as well as to determine whether the personal
representative can be substituted as a party to the action.
(Gordon v. Chicago, R.I. &; P. Ry. Co., supra, 154 Iowa 449,
451; :Alartin v. Baltimore &; Ohio R. Co., supra, 151 U.S.
673, 692; JJartin v. Wabash R. Co., supra, 142 F. 650, 651;
Baltimore d'i Ohio R. Co. v. Joy, supra, 173 U.S. 226, 231.)
Defendant's contention would require the courts to look to
their local statutes to determine "revival" and to the law of
the place where the tort occurred to determine "survival,"
but we have found no case in which this procedure was followed.
Since we find no compelling weight of authority for either
alternative, we are free to make a choice on the merits.
[11] We have concluded that survival of causes of action
should be governed by the law of the forum. [12] Survival
is not an essential part of the cause of action itself but relates
to the procedures available for the enforcement of the legal
claim for damages. Basically the question is one of the administration of decedents' estates, which is a purely local
proceeding. The problem here is whether the causes of action
that these plaintiffs had against Pullen before his death survive as liabilities of his estate. Section 573 of the Probate
Code provides that "all actions founded • • • upon any liability for physical injury, death or injury to property, may
be maintained by or against executors and administrators in
all cases in which the cause of action ••• is one which would
not abate upon the death of their respective testators or
intestates. • • ." Civil Code, section 956, provides that
lFor example, Code Civ. Proc., 1385: "An action or proceeding does
not abate by the death, or any disability of a party • • • 'f the cause
of acfw7I BUTvive or contifltle." (Italics added.) Bee also 28 U.B.C.A .•
:Rule 25(a) (1) ~leg. hist., U.B.Rev.Stat., § 955 (1874); Judiciary Act
of 1789, § 31]: • If a party dies /lnd the claim" not thereby ~ti7l0uished,
the court ••• may order substitution •••" of the personal representa'
tive. (Italics added.) The exMt language of :Rule 25 (a) (1) is repeated
in Arizona Code, 1939, 121·530.

)
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"A thing in action arising out of a wrong which results
in physical injury to the person ... shall not abate by reason
of the death of the wrongdoer ... ," and causes of action for
damage to property are maintainable against executors and
administrators under section 574 of the Probate Code. (See
Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288, 292-296 [169 P.2d 913, 171
A.L.R. 1379]; Cart v. Steen, supra, 36 Ca1.2d 437, 439-440.)
Decedent's estate is located in this state, and letters of administration were issued to defendant by the courts of this
state. [13] The responsibilities of defendant, as administrator of Pullen's estate, for injuries inflicted by Pullen before his death are governed by the laws of this state. This
approach has been followed in a number of well-reasoned
cases. (Matter of Killough, supra, 148 Misc. 73, 85-89; Herzog v. Stern, supra, 264 N.Y. 379; In re Vilas' Estate, supra,
166 Ore. 115; Martin v. Baltimore &; Ohio R. Co., supra, 151
U.S. 673; Whitten v. Bennett, supra, 77 F. 271, 273.) It
retains control of the administration of estates by the local
Legislature and avoids the problems involved in determining
the administrator's amenability to suit under the laws of other
states. [14] The common law doctrine actio personalis
moritur cum persona had its origin in a penal concept of tort
liability. (See Prosser, Law of Torts 950-951; PoIlock. The
Law of Torts (10th ed.) 64, 68.) Today, tort liabilities of the
sort involved in these actions are regarded as compensatory.
[15] When, as in the present case, all of the parties were
residents of this state, and the estate of the deceased tort
feasor is being administered in this state, plaintiff's right
to prosecute their causes of act.ion is governed by the laws
of this state relating to administration of estates.
The orders granting defendant's motions to abate are reversed, and the causes remanded for further proceedings.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.

v.

SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. In Cart Steen (1950),36 Cal.
2d 437, 442 [224 P.2d 723], this court held that under the
doctrine of nonsurvivability the abatement of an action by
the death of the injured person through the tort feasor's act
or otherwise. or by the death of the tort feasor, abates the
wrong as well; that the effect of a survival statute is to create
a right or cause of action rather than to either continue an
existing right or revive or extend a remedy theretofore RC-
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vued for the redress of an existing wrong; and that consequently a survival statute enacted after death of the tort
feasor did not apply to the tort or cause of action involved.
And more recently, in Estate 0/ ArbuUck (1953), Gnte, pp.
86, 88-89 [257 P.2d 433], we recognized the rule that the
burden of proof provisions of the Probate Code sections (259
., ,eg.) dealing with reciprocal inheritance rights are not
merely procedural in nature, but, rather, are substantive statutes regulating succession, and that consequently such rights
are to be determined by the law as it existed on the date of
decedent's death. (See, also, Estate of GiordGno (1948), 85
Oal.App.2d 588, 592, 594 [193P.2d 771].)
Irreconcilably inconsistent with the cases cited in the preeeding paragraph, the majority now hold that "Survival is
DOt an essential part of the cause of action itself but relates
to the procedures available for the enforcement of the legal
elaim for damages. Basically the question is one of the administration of decedents' estates, which is II. purely local
proceeding." If the above stated holding is to prevail, then
for the sake of the law's integrity and clarity, and in fairness to lower courts and to counsel, the cited cases should be
expressly overruled. But even more regrettable than the failure to either follow or unequivocally overrule the cited cases
is the character of the "rule" which is now promulgated: the
majority assert that henceforth "a statute or other rule of
law will be characterized as substantive or procedural according to the nature of the problem for which a characterization
must be made," thus suggesting that the court will no longer
be bound to consistent enforcement or uniform application
of "a statute or other rule of law" but will instead apply one
"rule" or another as the untrammeled whimsy of the majority may from time to time dictate, "according to the nature
of the problem" as they view it in a given case. This CODcept of the majority strikes deeply at what has been our proud
boast that ours waS a government of laws rather than of men.
Although any administration of an estate in .the. courts of
this state is local in a procedural sense, the rights and elaims
both in favor of and against such an estate are substantive
in. nature, and vest irrevocably at the date of death. (E,ttde
of PGtter,Ofl (1909),155 Cal. 626, 634 [102 P. 941, 132 Am.
St.Rep. 116, 18 Ann.Cas. 625, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 654].) Since
this court has clearly held that a right or cause of actiOD
created by a survival statute is likewise substantive, rather
than procedural, we should hold, if we would follow the law,

.)

